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Introduction 
Ethical considerations often feature as a late addition to deliberations about policy 
options. When they do emerge, they are too often conceptualised as constraints 
on the pursuit of predetermined goals. We hold that ethical issues ought to be, on 
the contrary, at the heart of choosing policy goals, as well as deciding how those 
goals will be pursued. Choosing one alternative action or policy over another 
(including doing nothing) is always an ethical decision; at least in so far as such 
alternatives affect differently the wellbeing of other people. 
In this paper we restrict our attention to the area of public health policy. 
What exactly constitutes 'public health' is open to dispute, but we suggest it is 
best to think about it as having a particular end in mind (improving population 
health) and certain kinds of paradigmatic behaviour (involving mass, collective 
activity). The focus on 'improving' population health should not be seen as being 
focused only on mere increase in the aggregate health of the population, as action 
to bring about greater equity in the distribution of health will also be relevant to this 
goal.[1] 
We believe that ethical frameworks can, in principle, be useful to policy 
makers and other decision-makers in public health contexts. However, they can 
also be problematic if they oversimplify or if they 'frame' decision-making with an 
inappropriate set of values.[2] Too often, the frameworks proposed for public health 
decision-making fail such tests: they can be incoherent and lacking in sufficient 
justification, it is unclear how they are to be used, or they yield counter-intuitive 
recommendations.[3] In this paper we propose a new framework for thinking about 
public health policy, contrast it with a leading contender framework,[4,5] and justify 
the use of our framework by pointing to its advantages both in terms of the decisions 
likely to be made and the useful information produced and disseminated. 
 
The Framework 
There are many proposed ethical frameworks in the literature that might be 
applicable to public health decision-making.[4,5,6,7] Each framework has slightly 
differing aims and content, and seeks to identify and promote particular ethical 
features. One common element to all these frameworks is that they propose 
substantive and particular ethical content. As an alternative to such frameworks, we 
propose what we call a value-based, pluralist framework. Our aim is not to 
contribute to either the philosophical debate on value pluralism or that on the 
nature of value, but rather to describe how a straight-forward form of pluralism 
(committed only to the modest view that there is more than one morally 
important value) coupled with a common-sense decision-making based on such 
values. This can provide a framework that is both practically useful and has various 
advantages over other frameworks on offer. 
Our framework has a number of distinguishing features in relation to the 
basis on which decisions are made. First, the framework allows that any important 
ethical consideration can help determine what decision is made. We use the word 
"value" broadly, to include the honouring of duties, the non-infringement of rights, 
and the development and expression of virtues. Second, in our framework, all values 
are 'equal', in the sense that none are assigned any special status prior to their use 
within the framework. This is taking to heart Charles Lindblom's insight that public 
decision-makers only confront values in increments and have little use for general 
value hierarchies. [8, p. 83] Third, public health measures typically affect the 
population as a whole, or large parts of it, and because they can impact on our 
lives in many different ways, public health decisions must consider a very wide range 
of values. Our framework is designed to facilitate the capture of all values relevant to a 
decision. 
While the first feature makes for great inclusivity and accommodation of 
different moral perspectives, the second feature means that some moral 
perspectives are nonetheless excluded. These include any perspective on which 
there are absolute side-constraints. One might say that we are ecumenical 
concerning the sort of values that can affect decision-making, but rigid concerning 
the role those values play relative to other values. Accounts that focus on 
side-constraints run into fundamental problems, as we will see below. 
For transparency and for illustration, some values that we would ourselves 
include in many public health decisions are individual health, population health, 
health equality, individual liberty, solidarity, social trust, and material wellbeing (for 
example as measured, if imperfectly, by Gross National Product (GNP)). All these 
values can obviously strongly affect and be affected by public health measures, and 
they will clearly clash in some cases. Some method of weighing the different values 
against each other needs to be used. For example, individual liberty and material 
wellbeing may be affected in a situation where liberty-limiting measures such as 
detention, quarantine, and restrictions on travel and transportation are introduced for 
the sake of protecting the health of the population. As shown by these examples, 
values can be relevant for public health either because they can be promoted or 
because they can be diminished, and typically both can occur (individual liberty and 
material wellbeing can, for example, be both promoted or impeded by removing 
direct health threats). 
Our framework consists of a series of explicit and formal steps to be taken 
as a means to reaching the best possible decisions about public health policy (or 
public health action). The steps are as follows: 
 
 
1. Identification: Identify relevant alternatives. 
2. Distinguishing: Distinguish relevant empirical differences between 
alternatives, including contingencies. 
3. Ranking: Rank, as far as possible, alternatives from best to worst. 
4. Evaluation: Make explicit, as far as possible, in what sense some alternatives 
are better than others. 
5. Documentation: Submit the result of the evaluation to a designated oversight 
institution. 
For most decision-makers, it is natural to start with the available alternatives [13, 
p. 82]. We want to emphasise, however, that step 1 is a creative process. 
Although, typically, many alternatives will be obvious, this step requires much 
more than merely listing the measures most commonly used in similar situations. 
Insufficient attention to this step risks leaving good or optimal alternatives without 
consideration. Which alternatives are relevant depends in part on what particular 
problem or issue calls for a decision to be made. Some decisions are more long-
term and strategic, in which case a wider array of alternatives will be relevant. 
Other decisions are more short-term and tactical, or focused, in which case the 
relevant alternatives will tend to be limited by the concrete issue at hand, though 
good alternatives can still seem surprising at first. To ensure that important 
alternatives are included, decision-makers should be inclusive and attentive to 
input from any stakeholders at this step in the process. 
Step 2 involves an analysis of the inherent characteristics and consequences of 
each identified alternative. As in step 1, creativity is needed. More than in step 1, 
empirical expertise is essential. This step is probably the most familiar to 
decision-makers. It concerns answering the common question “what would 
happen if we…?”. As a rule, we cannot know for sure what consequences 
alternatives will have, but can only assess the likelihood of various possible 
outcomes. Judgments should be made on the basis of the quality of the evidence 
that is considered relevant and how it may be applied to the decision in hand. 
Both step 1 and step 2 must be guided by judgments employing our values. We 
can aim to consider all possible alternatives and all the differences between 
them, but most of the time we will have to limit our attention to appealing 
alternatives and important differences. However, these necessary value 
judgments are provisional. They can be imprecise and open to error. They do not 
involve ranking, but only sorting into broad categories—appealing or not, 
important or not. At this stage, any disagreement or hesitation in relation to this 
sorting should be solved by being as inclusive as possible. In fact, it will often be 
wise to include all alternatives and differences that anyone either among 
decision-makers or other stakeholders consider appealing or important. This will 
make the explication or explanation in step 4 more comprehensive in the wider 
context in which the decision is made.  
 
Though step 2 anticipates steps 3 and 4, it is useful to first distinguish the 
empirical differences between alternatives, because disagreements on these are 
of another type than disagreements on values (empirical disagreements can in 
principle be settled by science), though the two are easily confused. Empirical 
differences include differences in the likelihood that certain outcomes will ensue and 
differences in the magnitude of impacts that may otherwise be shared by two 
or more alternatives. 
While step 2 can be very demanding, step 3 is perhaps even more so, since it 
involves both judgments on the relative importance of different values and 
judgments on the importance of risks and uncertainties (as identified in step 2). The 
demands are somewhat limited by focusing on the ranking of alternatives, without 
measuring their exact relative appeal. Sometimes, alternatives may defy any 
attempts at ranking. Two alternatives may seem equally good or on a par,[9] or they 
may seem incomparable because they each favour a different value, where these 
values seem incommensurable.[10, chapter 5] In either of these circumstances, the 
ranking will be incomplete. If the ranking does not identify one alternative as the 
optimal alternative, it may make sense to take two or more alternatives on to step 
4, to see if making the case for each alternative more explicit might help arbitrate 
between them. In the end, some alternative will have to be picked, as we are dealing 
with concrete decisions that cannot be avoided. 
Step 4 involves making it explicit in what sense the different possible 
alternatives are better or worse than others. These explanations must be phrased 
in terms of values. Minimally, they should identify what values are furthered or 
protected by what alternatives. Preferably, they should also identify what value 
comparisons motivate the ranking of alternatives in step 3. Such identifications or 
explanations will typically have the form "alternative A is better than alternative B 
because A has the cost x while B has the cost y and x is less important than y", or, 
for a more complex case, "alternative A is better than alternative B because A likely 
yields the benefit x while B definitely yields the benefits y and z, and a likelihood of 
x is more important than a certainty of y and z". If incomparabilities are involved, 
the explanation may have the form "alternative A is incomparable with alternative B 
because A has the benefit x and B has the benefit y, and x and y are 
incomparable [or incommensurable]". If top alternatives are on a par or 
incomparable, and so the outcome of the decision a result of mere picking, there 
should still be an explanation of this picking, of the form "we pick alternative A 
[B] because of... [some explanation in terms of positive features of alternative 
A [B] and/or negative features of alternative B [A]." 
Explanations may not, for example, have the form "alternative A is better 
than alternative B because alternative A has cost x and this is unacceptable". 
Appeal to such a principle is not permitted within our framework because this kind 
of principle would pre-empt the issue of how we should evaluate the totality of relevant 
values in thinking about policy options. Such a neutral consideration of values is at 
the heart of the framework. We will discuss and defend this feature in the next 
section. 
By putting step 3 before step 4 we want to leave room for the possibility that 
alternatives are ranked intuitively or based on a form of judgment that cannot be 
made fully explicit. We believe that alternatives are in fact often ranked in some 
such manner. We also do not want to exclude the possibility that intuitive or non-
explicit judgment is the epistemically most appropriate way of making moral 
judgments. 4 nevertheless of course requires that such judgment be made explicit 
to the greatest extent possible. 
Steps 3 and 4 jointly include both the ranking of alternatives and the 
explanation for this ranking. Together these two steps correspond to various other 
decision-making processes which start from the properties of alternatives to 
deduce a preference among these alternatives. An important class of such decision-
making processes are multiattribute decision analysis, as pioneered by Ralph 
Keeney and Howard Raiffa.[11] We do not mean to exclude the use of such helpful 
tools, and remain ecumenical concerning the process by which the ranking of 
alternatives is produced. If the decision-maker uses a bottom-up approach like 
Keeney and Raiffa's to rank alternatives, this same approach will also supply much 
of the explanation of this ranking. Importantly, however, our framework is in no way 
dependent on the possibility of a complete inventory of considerations needed for 
these processes, nor the attribution to these circumstances of a precise relative 
importance. 
Step 5 simply amounts to documenting the end result produced in step 4. 
How exactly this is best done will depend on the particular circumstances, including 
the available resources of the decision-making agent or agency. The 
documentation should be submitted to some oversight institution that 
oversees the proper functioning of the public health agent, holding it accountable 
for its decisions, and for making decisions in accordance with the framework. This 
oversight institution could be the public. However, even if this is normally the case, 
this may not always be possible; for example, where information is retained from 
the public so as to avoid undesirable reactions, such as panic in the face of a 
pandemic.1 
At steps 2, 3 and 4, new information and new insights are likely to surface, 
which may lead to the identification of additional relevant alternatives. This is an 
important part of the deliberative process. Decision-makers should continuously 
consider whether new information makes it appropriate to go back to a previous step 
and continue from there. This means that the steps, despite having a clear order, 
are not strictly chronologically separated. The decision-maker can return to an 
earlier step because of new evidence or a new perspective. However, the order of 
the steps is still important because it structures the deliberative process. For example, 
though thinking about the ranking of alternatives may lead one to notice 
additional alternatives or empirical differences between alternatives, which 
warrants going back a step or two, disagreement on the exact value of some 
alternative or empirical difference should not interfere with the identification of 
further alternatives or differences. 
 
                                                          
1
 Step 5 is the closest we come to a publicity condition. Our modest commitment to 
publicity is one of the things that distinguishes our framework from Daniels and Sabin's 
Accountability for Reasonableness framework. Our framework also does not contain any 
steps corresponding to the relevance or the revision and appeals condition of Daniels 
and Sabin's framework.[12, e.g. pp. 118-119] We do not engage with the issue of how the 
decision-maker should form her moral outlook, but limit ourselves to the issue of how she 
should decide based on the moral outlook she has. That said, we do believe that using our 
framework will promote transparency and accountability, as well as moral development or 
learning, as we will explain below. 
Values or constraints? 
By understanding public health decisions in terms of values which are all equal, we 
part ways with frameworks that understand some values as goals to be promoted and 
others as constraints on the promotion of such goals. One very influential such 
framework was presented by a collective of established scholars in 2002413] Their 
general approach is to consider "how much weight and significance to assign to the 
ends and effects of protecting and promoting public health relative to the other 
considerations that limit and constrain ways to pursue such outcomes."[13, p.171] 
The concrete output is a list of five justificatory conditions "intended to help 
determine whether promoting public health warrants overriding such values as 
individual liberty or justice in particular cases."[13, p. 172] There is, obviously, a very 
clear distinction made between goals and constraints. The first author behind this 
framework, James Childress, has gone on to develop a similar but more elaborate 
and more specific framework, in collaboration with Ruth Bernheim.4 Childress and 
Bernheim recommit to this framework, with minor modifications, in a further recent 
publication.5 We consider this framework to be the state of the art in this area and 
so will focus our critique on it and use it for purposes of contrast to further explain 
our own proposed framework. 
Childress and Bernheim's framework, or, as they say, the "elements of a 
framework", is supposed to "apply both to the formation of public health policies 
and to public health officials' decisions within these indeterminate policies".[4, p. 
159] However, they limit their scope to "conflicts that arise in the selection of means 
to protect and promote public health".[4, p. 158] It is, in other words, only the means 
aspect of the formation of policy that the framework addresses. As we will try to 
show, this focus on means, in isolation from goals, severely limits the applicability 
of the framework. Childress and Bernheim propose that the relevant issues around 
means concern, first, effectiveness and efficiency, and, second, "any ethical and 
other constraints that may apply to possible means."[4, p. 159] The presumption 
is, in other words, that while public health goals are to be promoted, other values 
operate as constraints on the protection and promotion of these goals, rather than as 
desirable ends in their own right. 
Childress and Bernheim do not list which values they believe operate as 
constraints rather than as ends, but it is obvious from their discussion that "liberty" 
is one of them. They call their framework "presumptivist" and explain that their 
presumption in favour of liberty can be rebutted under certain conditions. A liberty-
limiting decision will meet these conditions if 
1) it has a "reasonable prospect of success", 
2) it is "necessary and essential", 
3) it is the "the least restrictive and least intrusive alternative", 
4) its "probable benefits (in risk reduction), minus any probable negative 
effects, are sufficient to rebut the presumption", and 
5) it is "imposed impartially".[4, pp. 160-161] 
While the presumption in favour of liberty is merely a presumption, the conditions 
are presumably strict conditions for when that presumption is rebutted. Condition 2 
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and 3 are closely related, as Childress and Bernheim note, but they are not identical: 
While condition 2 requires that any limitation of liberty be necessary and essential, 
condition 3 requires that any limitation of liberty be as small as possible. 
We see two major problems with this framework. The first concerns its 
applicability to real decisions and stems from conditions 2, 3 and 5. The second 
problem concerns an indirect reliance on a balancing of values the framework is 
designed to avoid. This problem stems from conditions 1 and 4. 
Regarding the first problem, note first that, even if we have a rather specific 
goal in mind, there are typically different ways to achieve this goal and these 
different means will typically vary in what exactly they achieve and with what 
likelihood. Consider the goal that Childress and Bernheim use to illustrate their 
framework - to stop "the SARS outbreak or an avian influence pandemic". Childress 
and Bernheim only consider and compare two means - forcible quarantine and 
requests for voluntary quarantine. It seems obvious that there are various other 
possible means to this end, including pre-vaccination and targeted use of antiviral 
agents (as discussed and compared with quarantine by Longini et. al.)[14]. Another 
relevant measure to consider would be social distancing by cancelling events and 
closing schools and workplaces, etc. (on the effectiveness of social distancing 
generally see e.g. Glass et. al.;[15] on the use of social distancing to stop real 
pandemics, see e.g. Ferguson et. al.)[16]. However, even if we accept a 
dichotomous choice between forcible quarantine and voluntary quarantine, it 
seems very likely that these two means will vary in likely outcomes and likelihood 
of outcomes within different contexts. Perhaps, for example, voluntary quarantine 
is more uncertain due to difficulty in estimating people's willingness to comply. 
Perhaps, on the contrary, forcible quarantine is more uncertain due to the risk of 
organized non-compliance as a reaction to what is perceived as an overly 
intrusive measure. 
Now return to Childress and Bernheim's framework. Consider condition 2. 
This condition (as well as condition 3 and 5) have both a weak and a strong 
interpretation. On the weak interpretation, intrusions should be avoided when they 
serve no purpose in terms of goal-fulfilment. On this interpretation, means are 
"necessary and essential" if they are necessary to increase either the achievement 
of the goal or the likelihood of such an increase. As Childress and Bernheim 
phrase it at one point, "other things [being] equal ... persuasion ... or other 
incentives ... should have priority over forcible detention."[4, p. 160] Interpreted in 
this way, a draconian measure may be justified if it is only slightly more effective, 
or slightly less uncertain, than a very innocuous measure that may still be quite 
effective. For example, imposing a strict general curfew may be warranted to stop 
a pandemic, even if information and voluntary vaccination would also stop the 
pandemic, only somewhat slower. Such implications seem at odds with Childress 
and Bernstein's focus on the special status and importance of liberty. 
On the alternative, strong interpretation of condition 2, means are "necessary 
and essential" if they are completely unavoidable. On this interpretation, intrusions 
should be avoided at any cost. For example, voluntary quarantine should be 
preferred to forced quarantine even if it is likely to be much less effective. This 
interpretation gives liberty (and impartiality) priority over other values. This, 
however, is not the flexible framework Childress and Bernheim claim to present, but 
rather an "absolutism" which they reject, arguing explicitly that giving priority to 
any value over any other "encounters devastating counterexamples" and is 
"unable to address all real-world complexities". [4, p. 160] 
The strong interpretation would be more plausible if the only alternatives 
that are eligible are those that reach a particular goal, such as stopping the tragically 
real and ongoing Ebola outbreak. This would exclude both non-intrusive but 
ineffective alternatives and passivity. At points, it sounds like Childress and 
Bernheim mean their framework to be applied only to means to some very specific 
such goal. However, as already noted, alternative public health strategies or 
measures will always vary in the degree to and the likelihood with which they reach 
some generic goal. Suppose, for example, that quarantining 100 000 people will 
restrict further spread of the disease to below 1 000 infections with a .8 probability, 
and quarantining 500 000 people will achieve the same result with a .9 probability. 
Or, similarly, that the smaller quarantine will in all likelihood restrict further 
infections to below 1 000 while the larger will with the same likelihood restrict 
further infections to below 500. Now, what means are necessary? The framework 
cannot tell us this without prior specification of the goal in terms of, for example, 
some minimal probability for some maximal number of further infections. Such 
specification is hard work and, furthermore, will risk excluding alternatives that are 
almost as effective in terms of specific goal achievement but much less intrusive, or 
in other ways much better than the best eligible alternative. Therefore, moderation of 
the strong condition by restricting eligible alternatives makes the framework quite 
unhelpful. 
It seems that neither the weak nor the strong interpretation is plausible. 
Various other interpretations are of course possible. One family of interpretations 
take the conditions to not really be conditions at all, but rather reminders of relevant 
considerations, rather like a list of values. However, such an interpretation is not 
only in strong tension with the explicit formulation of the conditions as conditions, it 
is also in tension with Childress and Bernheim's rejection of what they call "the 
contextual approach" which recommends that a decision-maker "simply balances all 
of the relevant values in a particular context".[4, p. 160] 
At the risk of being pedantic, we note that there is in fact a further 
requirement built into condition 2. Decision-makers "must be able to provide strong 
reasons for their belief that a coercive approach is necessary". This is an epistemic 
condition, suggesting that there are stricter demands on certainty regarding the 
necessity of liberty-limiting means than regarding other things, such as for example 
the other conditions on the list, or regarding the possibility that liberty will be 
limited (perhaps rather weak reasons to believe that liberty will be limited are 
enough to rule out the promotion of individual health?). Childress and Bernheim say 
no more on the topic, so perhaps they do not intended a separate epistemic 
requirement but rather just mean to emphasise the importance of the central 
requirement in condition 2. 
Lacking a plausible interpretation of condition 2 for comparisons between 
means that differ in more than one dimension, we should perhaps conclude that the 
framework is not applicable to such comparisons. In some cases, there is no need to 
distinguish the strong and the weak interpretation. Perhaps the framework is only 
intended to be applied to such cases. These are cases where alternatives differ 
only in the extent to which they diminish liberty. Childress and Bernstein seem to 
have such a case in mind when they compare forced with voluntary quarantine as 
an illustration of condition 2: "It might be possible, for instance, to secure voluntary 
compliance with quarantine requests without resort to the threat or use of 
force".[4, p. 160] However, very few, if any, real alternatives will vary only in their 
degree of intrusiveness. For example, in their own chosen quarantine case, the 
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two choices will almost certainly have differential impact upon the disease, so at a 
minimum we face a balancing of intrusiveness and effectiveness, not to 
mention possible differential impacts of degrees of intrusiveness upon the 
distribution of the disease in the population etc. etc. It would seem, in sum, that 
Childress and Bernheim's framework is either absolutist, or minimalist, or has no 
useful practical application. 
We have focused our discussion on condition 2 but the requirement of 
condition 3 that "coercive measures should be necessary in degree as well as in 
kind" obviously has the very same structure and concerns the same value — liberty. 
The requirement of impartiality in condition 5 is also very similar. As with 
limitations of liberty, some values can be realized to a larger extent or with a greater 
likelihood if some partiality is allowed. For example, public health measures can 
target people based on characteristics listed by Childress and Bernheim as 
inappropriate: "race, ethnic background, socioeconomic class, or geographical 
location". Targeted measures may increase goal achievement because, statistically 
speaking, people with these characteristics may be more likely to benefit or more 
likely to pose a risk to others. Therefore, if this is the sort of partiality that condition 
5 forbids, absolutism can be avoided only at the price of limiting the application of 
this condition to comparisons between alternatives that differ only in their degree of 
partiality. 
It may be, however, that Childress and Bernheim use "partiality" in another 
sense. In discussing this condition, they denounce singling out people for blame 
based on the quoted broad characteristics. Since blaming is seldom an efficient 
method for reaching worthwhile goals (though it can be), absolutism may come 
rather cheap. Indeed, Childress and Bernheim note that condition 5 may seem 
"unnecessary or even useless", but they nevertheless defend it by pointing to 
persisting discrimination. We might therefore interpret this condition as requiring 
not impartiality in a wide sense, but only avoidance of unnecessary and unjust 
discrimination. This is reasonable enough. However, it is not practical to construct a 
framework by adding a presumption against all mistakes and moral failings that 
decision-makers are prone to, and if one would nonetheless try, the list would have 
much more than five items. Therefore, this weak, anti-discrimination interpretation 
of condition 5 arguably renders it redundant. 
Before turning to the second major problem with Childress and Bernheim's 
framework, we should note, for completeness, that the framework is not necessarily 
applicable even to decisions between alternatives that differ only in the degree to 
which they entail limitations of liberty and partial treatment. This is because no 
guidance is given regarding the relative importance of these two values, and the 
values may be interdependent. Sometimes we can reach a goal either by using some 
force, or by being somewhat partial. 
The second major problem with Childress and Bernstein's framework is that 
it reduces to a form of balancing of values, only one that is more complicated and 
obscure than the straightforward balancing that we favour. Childress and Bernstein's 
condition 1 requires "a reasonable prospect of success".[4, p. 160] This could 
possibly be understood as imposing a set threshold probability of success for all 
public health measures, but this seems clearly unreasonable. In desperate 
situations, we may have to try measures with a probability of success lower than 
what we require of more everyday measures. Moreover, a lower prospect of success 
must be accepted for a very important goal which entails very minor intrusions than for 
a less important goal which entails greater intrusions. Besides, Childress and 
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Bernheim do not propose a rigid threshold. Therefore, the only plausible 
interpretation is that what counts as a "reasonable prospect" depends on what is 
at stake — i.e. what can be achieved and at what cost, particularly in terms of 
liberty limitations. However, this is just to say that what is a reasonable prospect 
of success depends on what values are affected, in what way, with what 
probability. So while Childress and Bernstein's framework explicitly forbids 
balancing values against each other outright, it also demands that we balance 
them against each other in order to establish reasonable prospects of success. 
Condition 4 is even more explicitly a balancing condition, requiring that "the 
probable benefits (in risk reduction), minus any probable negative effects, are 
sufficient".[4, p. 160] This is most plausibly taken to mean that all possible benefits 
and costs should be considered, together with their associated probability, to ensure 
that the net expected effect is positive, perhaps by some margin. On this 
interpretation, condition 4 includes elements of all the first four steps of our 
preferred framework and amounts to a quite straight-forward balancing of values. 
The only alternative interpretation we can see emphasises the use of "probable" and 
takes this to mean that we should only consider benefits and costs which pass some 
threshold of probability. This, however, seems clearly unreasonable when 
considering improbable but catastrophic outcomes. Why should we disregard 
horrific possible consequences just because the likelihood of their realization is 
below some threshold? Moreover, it seems quite arbitrary to define this threshold, 
and quite unhelpful to have it once it is defined. One pictures decision-makers 
fiercely debating whether an outcome with an estimated 7% probability is probable 
or not probable, since this will make or break a public health proposal. 
We have devoted substantial, perhaps excessive, attention to Childress and 
Bernheim's framework for public health decision-making. Much of our critique is 
admittedly directed at particular details of their framework. However, we boldly 
claim that any framework that operationalizes important values in the form of 
constraints on permissible means will face similar problems. At the very least, the 
problems we have identified with Childress and Bernheims's framework are hurdles 
to be overcome by any similar framework.  
Intuitions to the effect that some means are impermissible typically point to a 
warranted concern that some value should be protected. However, it is hard to 
believe that any means have such enormous costs in terms of some value that they 
cannot be warranted by any gain in any other value. At least this goes for the values 
that are most obviously at stake in public health decisions. It may be that some 
means are always impermissible, whatever is at stake. Arguments to this effect have 
been presented in the case of torture, notably in a recent book by Matthew 
Kramer.[17] We assume that no such extreme means are at stake in public health 
decision-making, although some means will be more contentious than others. 
We believe that ranking alternatives is part of everyday life as well as 
political and medical decision-making. The only way to avoid such ranking is to 
subsume every decision under some principle which does not in itself require 
ranking. We do not believe there are such principles for public health decision-
making, or at least have not yet encountered one. Childress and Bernheim 
present two arguments against what they call the balancing or the contextualist 
approach: 1) It is too intuitive. 2) In real conflicts between the community and the 
individual, the community usually wins.[4, p. 160]. Concerning 1, we believe that 
by making explicit on what basis some alternatives are ranked higher than others, 
a decision-maker learns about the underlying values and exposes her judgment to 
debate and scrutiny. This process will encourage decision-making that is based not 
on impulses but on considered judgments (call them intuitions or not). 
Concerning 2, to the extent that it is true that the community usually wins in 
conflicts with individuals, this may well be appropriate given that the community 
consists of many individuals. When it is not appropriate, explicit attention to all 
values affected, including individual liberty, is the best way to get things right. It 
makes sense to us for a decision-maker to say that the forcible quarantine of even 
one single individual is not justified by minor reductions in health risks for very 
many others. It does not make any sense to us, however, to say that the forcible 
quarantine of one individual is justified if and only if it is the necessary, least 
restrictive and impartial means to the goal that we happen to have. 
Which values? 
Childress and Bernheim presuppose that the only value to be promoted by public 
health actions is the unitary goal of public health. We have argued that the values 
which appear as constraints on the realization of that goal in Childress and 
Bernheim's framework are in fact values on a par with the value of public health, or 
perhaps with the set of values which are typically included under the heading 
"public health". Individual liberty is a value just like individual health is a value and 
they should both be given their due. Values can be either promoted or diminished by 
public health actions. Some values are more typically promoted and some more 
typically diminished, but no constant relationships should be assumed. A decision 
by an organization which has been given or has taken on the task of promoting and 
protecting public health may very well in some instances promote liberty and 
diminish health (for example by easing overly strict safety requirements). It may 
even be an explicit aim to promote liberty. 
With this pluralistic view on the possible values that guide public health 
decision, are there any limits to what values may be relevant? It is consistent with 
our framework to restrict what values are eligible for consideration, as long as all 
eligible values are balanced against each other on equal terms. A restriction on 
eligible values may be motivated by practical concerns with coordination between 
various agents, including government agencies, and it may be motivated by 
normative concerns with what values it is appropriate to consider for agents which 
are focused on public health issues.[18] Though we recognize the value of 
coordination between people as well as between government agencies, we do not 
believe there are any general restrictions on what values are eligible for 
consideration in public health decision-making. 
It is possible that there may be constraints on what values a government 
should consider more generally, in any policy area. Perhaps a government should 
not be concerned with values that are too controversial.[19] We also recognize that 
there may be special weightings of values that apply generally. Perhaps a 
government should be more concerned with the health and wellbeing of their 
citizens or their residents, that with that of non-citizens or non-residents. We do not 
take a stand on these very general issues, but merely acknowledge them. We do 
presuppose, of course, in opposition to some political philosophies, that the 
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government should be concerned with the health of at least some large segment 
of the population residing within its borders. 
We further recognize that public health policy and public health work is 
regulated by law. We mean our framework to be used in the first instance by public 
health decision-makers acting within the limits of the law. At the same time, we 
believe that our framework makes it more acceptable to grant public health agencies 
relatively wide discretion to act within the boundaries set by a legitimate and 
democratic government. Typically, there are many things that public health agents 
are not explicitly required to do, but that they are not legally prevented from doing 
either. Since public health decisions should consider such values as individual 
liberty and material wellbeing, which are not necessarily related to health, there 
could theoretically be situations in which an agent or agency which is generally 
supposed to be promoting health instead seeks to promote some other value. 
In a well-functioning society, there will be a complex system of different 
public agents charged with promoting and protecting various values. In such a 
context, it will rarely be best for a public health agency to use their time and 
resources to promote some value unrelated to public health, since this will interfere 
with the work of other agencies and will be less efficient than allowing each agency 
to do what it does best. However, in less fortunate circumstances, it may well be 
best for such an agency to promote values unrelated to public health. Consider a 
public health agency in a very poor country with a generally corrupt and 
incompetent government, where this agency is uncorrupted and efficient, perhaps 
thanks to direct support by some foreign benefactor. Should this agency stick to 
traditional public health work? Perhaps not. Perhaps it should build roads or 
irrigation systems. Perhaps it should do so even if sticking with traditional public 
health work would more obviously and directly benefit typical public health goals 
such as individual health. It may even be that it should do so at the price of 
diminished public health, though because of the broad scope of public health it is 
difficult to find examples. Consider a country in chaos, which is under threat from a 
foreign power that will enforce an authoritarian but very health-conscious regime. In 
this situation, a well organized public health agency should perhaps use its 
resources, such as its information dissemination networks, to prevent occupation, 
rather than use them to, for example, prevent disease. We do not see any 
absurdity or threat to the well-orderedness of society in admitting that there are or 
could be these unusual cases. 
In sum, we do not see any principled limits to what values a public health 
agency should consider or promote, though in most circumstances practical 
considerations will entail that it should focus overwhelmingly on typical public 
health work. 
Justification of the framework 
We have explained how Childress and Bernheim's framework is unhelpful and 
impractical in several respects, while noting that our framework does not have these 
disadvantages. Instead of entangling decision-making in complicated multiple 
weighings or half-weighings as well as in the consideration of complicated 
conditions that require certain disvalues to be minimized or entirely avoided, we 
propose a straight-forward consideration of all relevant alternatives to be judged in 
terms of how they fare in respect to all relevant values. One major justification for 
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our framework is that this approach simply directs decisions efficiently towards the 
best alternatives. However, the framework is further justified by the informational 
content conveyed by making decisions in this way. 
Because step 4 in our framework involves explication of the reasons for a 
decision, in terms of values, and because step 5 involves making this explication or 
explanation available, any decision made under our framework will yield a 
dissemination of useful information. There will be an explanation, in terms of 
values, as to why one alternative is the preferred one. This explanation will contain 
information on what values and disvalues the decision-makers considered relevantly 
affected by the decision, and, to some extent, the relative importance of these 
effects. This information is useful because it can be generalized to the extent that 
decision-makers keep their moral outlook,. Any other decision where values are 
affected in similar ways, though the empirical particulars may be different, can be 
expected to go the same way. For decisions where the highest ranked alternative 
is vastly superior, future decisions in similar cases will predictably go the same 
way even if there are some not insignificant changes in how other values are 
affected. If future decisions are like past ones except that some new alternative is 
available with more value or less disvalue relative to an earlier preferred 
alternative, it can be predicted that this new alternative will be chosen. And so on. 
Over time, the pattern of decisions made will clarify how the decision-maker 
compares different amounts of different values, and predictions can become more 
accurate. Assuming that the evaluations are transitive in regard to betterness or 
preferedness, a series of decisions that only partly overlap in what values are 
relevant will together yield substantial predictively useful information. Daniels, 
discussing his similar publicity condition, notes how "the pattern of such decisions 
will resemble a type of 'case law'."[12. p. 121] 
To illustrate, if a public health official who follows our framework decides to 
detain 100 people for two weeks in order to save one statistical life, we may assume 
that she would do the same to save more than one life (other things being equal). If 
she then decides to accept a low risk of non life-threatening but cumbersome 
disease to 10,000,000 people rather than detain 100 people for two weeks, we may 
assume that she would accept the same risks in order to save one statistical life. In 
reality, alternatives will seldom be identical in this way, but they will sometimes 
be relevantly similar and with some contextual interpretation, decisions and 
explanations will convey a rich body of information in the aggregate. 
Contrast this with a public health official who uses a framework which tells 
her to prefer the least restrictive alternative. Assume that this official decides to 
detain 100 people for two weeks because this is the least restrictive way of saving 
one statistical life. This conveys very little information on what to expect from this 
decision-maker in other, future decisions. We may of course predict that she will 
choose the least restrictive alternative, but this may sometimes be very restrictive. 
Perhaps next time the least restrictive way of saving one statistical life is to detain 
10,000 people for two months. Regardless of how many decisions are made 
based on this rule, we will never know how much restriction we may expect in order 
to achieve any particular goal. Childress and Bernheim's framework is, of course, 
richer than the one condition of preferring the least restrictive alternative. 
Deliberation on conditions 1 and 4 in their framework will convey useful 
information. However, this is only because and only to the extent that these 
conditions incorporate elements of the balancing of values. 
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In general, that a decision meets a number of conditions conveys little 
information beyond this very fact. A large set of decisions based on Childress and 
Bernheim's conditions 2, 3 and 5 will teach us what the decision-maker means by 
intrusion and by partiality, but not how those disvalues compare with other values 
and disvalues. In particular, when you disagree with a decision made according to a 
list of conditions structured within a framework, there is not much to learn from 
further discussion and explanation. Supposedly, explaining a decision made 
according to such a framework means explaining how the preferred alternative 
meets the conditions. It does not mean explaining why those conditions are 
important and it does not mean motivating why any particular alternative (among 
those which meet the conditions - which may be many) is to be preferred. 
Motivating a value-based decision, in contrast, means explaining the 
importance of the affected values and disvalues, and how they relate to each other. 
The public health official in the above example may explain that two weeks of 
detention for 100 people adds up to 200 weeks or approximately four years and that 
this is less than the loss of quality time from one early death. Or, less technically, 
she may explain how early death is an ultimate tragedy and how it impacts on 
family, friends and society, and compare that with the relatively mild effects of 
detention imposed for public health reasons. If she has used comprehensive 
multiattribute utility analysis, she may provide rich tables of considerations with 
their relative importance. Whatever the decision-maker says to explain her value 
comparison, it will tell us much about the relative importance she attributes to 
different values. This sort of information will help our predictions concerning how 
she will decide in completely different situations, where some of the same values are 
affected. 
Since, as noted above, the predictive value of the information conveyed on a 
value-based approach is dependent on the consistency of the moral outlook of the 
decision-maker, decision-makers should arguably declare when they change this 
outlook, either as this happens, or in connection to the explication of new decisions 
that are not in line with earlier decisions. This requirement may be considered an 
integrated part of step 4, but was not listed above since it may alternatively be 
handled outside of the decision-making process. List of conditions-type frameworks, 
such as Childress and Bernstein's are similarly dependent on the conditions, and 
their interpretations, remaining unchanged. However, it may perhaps be an 
advantage of this approach that changes in moral outlook will lead to changes in the 
list of conditions, which are potentially more obvious than changes in values. 
We have focused on how information about the basis on which decisions are 
made can help us to predict future decisions. Prediction, however, is only the most 
obvious use of such information. Its availability is also a prerequisite for 
transparency of decision-making. If the only information available regarding a 
decision is that it meets a number of conditions, transparency is rather superficial. If, 
on the other hand, alternatives are ranked and the ranking motivated in terms of all 
relevant values, many detailed considerations will be open to scrutiny and 
evaluation. This rich information also makes possible much more comprehensive 
responsibility ascriptions. Under a value-based framework, decision-makers can be 
held responsible for the detailed value judgments they make, and not only for their 
final decisions. Under a list of conditions-type framework, a decision-maker can 
only be held responsible for her interpretation and application of the list of 
conditions. Transparency and responsibility are of course in turn vital to democracy 
and healthy meritocracy. 
Finally, value-based decision-making naturally facilitates learning from 
previous judgments. A simple way to show this is to point to the greater occasion for 
error — the best alternative may have been preferred, but there may still be 
mistakes in the ranking of non-optimal alternatives. Under a list of conditions 
framework, in contrast, only the decision itself can be either correct or incorrect. 
Furthermore, an incorrect decision under a list of conditions-type framework is just that, 
mistakes are either/or, they do not allow for degrees of correctness. Value-based 
decisions, in contrast, can be mistaken to the degree that the relative importance 
of any one of two values is exaggerated or downplayed. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that our framework is justified by the outcomes of using it. This is 
intended as a form of mid-level justification. We do not take a stand on issues of 
ultimate justification, and it would be unnecessary to do so in this context. Childress 
and Bernheim propose that the use of the police power "requires moral 
justification that the public in whose name the policies are carried out could 
reasonably be expected to accept."[4, p. 158] This contractarian approach is one 
way to provide a fundamental justification. We are happy to accept it provisionally 
but do not exclude alternatives. However, in disagreement with Childress and 
Bernheim, we believe that all decisions require justification, not just those that 
might reduce liberty. 
By facilitating prediction and promoting transparency and comprehensive 
responsibility, as well as learning and development, our value-based framework 
yields positive effects through its very application, and these positive effects are 
such that they will tend to make for increasingly higher quality decisions. This 
strengthens the propensity of the framework to direct decisions towards the best 
alternatives. This tendency depends more fundamentally on the framework's 
inclusive focus on all relevant values, understood as formally equal, without vague 
presumptions and other unnecessary complications. 
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